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ABSTRACT
This paper decomposes inflation-indexed and nominal government bond excess return predictability
into liquidity, real interest rate risk and inflation risk. We estimate a systematic liquidity premium
in Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) yields relative to nominal yields. The liquidity premium
is around 30 bps during normal times but larger during the early years of TIPS and during the financial
crisis 2008-2009. We find that time-varying liquidity premia in TIPS and time-varying inflation risk
premia in nominal bonds generate return predictability. We find no evidence that shocks to relative











lviceira@hbs.eduSince their ￿rst issuance in 1997, in￿ ation-indexed bonds in the U.S. have gained wide
acceptance among investors and they now constitute a signi￿cant fraction of the stock of U.S.
Treasury debt. Yet many academics and Treasury market pundits argue that these bonds,
known as Treasury In￿ ation Protected Securities (TIPS), have a smaller and less liquid mar-
ket than their nominal counterparts, U.S. Treasury notes and bonds.2 This paper conducts
an empirical investigation of the sources and magnitude of illiquidity in the TIPS market.
Conditional on a measure of the liquidity discount on TIPS relative to nominal Treasury
bonds, it asks to what extent liquidity risk and to what extent time-varying in￿ ation risk
and time-varying real interest rate risk generate excess return predictability in government
bonds.
Understanding the liquidity di⁄erential between TIPS and Treasury bonds is important
for several reasons. First, it is well-known that the Expectations Hypothesis of the term
structure of interest rates does not hold for U.S. nominal government bonds (Campbell and
Shiller 1991, Fama and Bliss 1987, Cochrane and Piazzesi 2005). Equivalently, excess returns
on U.S. nominal government bonds are predictable. Explanations of return predictability in
government bond returns emphasize either a time-varying real interest rate risk premium,
or a time-varying in￿ ation risk premium, or a combination of those two (Wachter 2006,
Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira 2010). P￿ ueger and Viceira (2011) have highlighted that
in￿ ation-indexed bonds can be very helpful in disentangling in￿ ation risk and real interest
rate risk as the fundamental sources of government bond return predictability. But such
an exercise requires identifying price and return di⁄erentials between the two bond markets
2For evidence of relatively lower liquidity in TIPS see D￿ Amico, Kim, and Wei (2008), Campbell, Shiller,
and Viceira (2009), Fleckenstein, Longsta⁄, and Lustig (2010), Fleming and Krishnan (2009), Dudley, Roush,
and Steinberg Ezer (2009), Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2010), and Haubrich, Pennacchi, and Ritchken
(2011).
1which are due to liquidity and not due to sources of fundamental risk.
Second, over the 11 year period starting in 1999 the average annualized excess log return
on 10 year TIPS equalled a substantial 4:7%, almost half a percentage point higher than
that on comparable nominal U.S. government bonds. This signi￿cant return di⁄erential
is puzzling because both nominal and in￿ ation-indexed bonds are fully backed by the U.S.
government. Moreover, the real cash ￿ ows on nominal bonds are exposed to surprise in￿ ation
while TIPS coupons and principal are in￿ ation protected. Is all or part of this return
di⁄erential compensation to TIPS investors for holding a less liquid form of U.S. Treasury
debt?
Third, investors and policy makers use the yield di⁄erential between nominal bonds and
in￿ ation-indexed bonds, popularly known among practitioners as ￿breakeven in￿ ation,￿as a
gauge of bond market long-term expectations of in￿ ation and its variation over time. But if
TIPS trade at a discount over nominal Treasury bonds due to di⁄erential liquidity, breakeven
in￿ ation will underestimate in￿ ation expectations. Moreover, variation in this liquidity dis-
count over time might get confused with changes in in￿ ation expectations. For instance,
breakeven in￿ ation fell to almost zero during the ￿nancial crisis and, for some maturities,
was even negative. Did this re￿ ect a sudden and large change in in￿ ation expectations
towards a long period of sustained de￿ ation? Or was this caused by a sudden episode of
illiquidity in the TIPS market with no signi￿cant change in long-term in￿ ation expectations?
It is natural to expect that TIPS might have been less liquid than nominal Treasury bonds
in their early years, when issuance of these securities was small, and investors might have
had to learn about them. However, there are reasons to believe that liquidity di⁄erentials
between the nominal bond market and the in￿ ation-indexed bond market might persist
2beyond an initial stage of learning and supply buildup. For any investor the riskless asset
is an in￿ ation-indexed bond whose cash ￿ ows match his consumption plan (Campbell and
Viceira 2001, Wachter 2003), so that in￿ ation-indexed bonds should typically be held by
buy-and-hold investors. Thus the return di⁄erential might have been the result of a liquidity
discount demanded by investors that has diminished￿ but not necessarily disappeared￿ over
time with the growth in TIPS trading and adoption among investors.
We examine these questions adopting an empirically ￿ exible approach. We estimate
the liquidity di⁄erential between in￿ ation-indexed bonds and nominal bonds using a vari-
ety of proxies for liquidity. We ￿nd a statistically signi￿cant and economically important
time-varying liquidity component in breakeven in￿ ation. While controlling for time-varying
in￿ ation expectations, liquidity variables can explain more than half the time-variation in
U.S. breakeven in￿ ation. After adjusting for liquidity, our ￿ndings suggest that liquidity-
adjusted breakeven in￿ ation has been quite stable and close to three percent over our sample
period. Liquidity-adjusted breakeven in￿ ation remained above 1.7% during the ￿nancial cri-
sis, while realized breakeven in￿ ation was close to zero or even negative for some maturities,
suggesting that low realized breakeven in￿ ation may not have been a re￿ ection of investors￿
long-term de￿ ationary fears but instead an increase in the relative illiquidity of TIPS.
Over our sample period the yield on TIPS has been about 65 basis points larger on
average than it would have been if TIPS had been as liquid as nominal Treasury bonds.
This high average re￿ ects extraordinary events associated with very low liquidity in this
market. We ￿nd a high liquidity discount in the years following the introduction of TIPS
(about 70 to 100 bps), which we attribute to learning and low trading volume, and during
the fall of 2008 at the height of the ￿nancial crisis (beyond 150 bps). We estimate a much
3lower but still signi￿cant liquidity discount of between 30 to 70 bps between 2004 and 2007
and after the crisis.
Our estimated liquidity di⁄erential exhibits a highly signi￿cantly positive CAPM beta
with respect to the stock market. This suggests that investors in TIPS bear systematic risk
due to time-varying liquidity and should be compensated in terms of a return premium.
We next disentangle bond return predictability due to liquidity, due to time-varying real
interest rate risk and due to time-varying in￿ ation risk. Although government bonds in large
and stable economies are generally considered default-free, their real cash ￿ ows are exposed
to other risks. The prices of both in￿ ation-indexed and nominal government bonds change
with the economy-wide real interest rate. Consequently, nominal and in￿ ation-indexed bond
risk premia will re￿ ect investors￿perception of real interest rate risk, which may vary over
time. The prices of nominal government bonds, but not in￿ ation-indexed government bonds,
also vary with expected in￿ ation, so in￿ ation risk will impact their risk premia.3 Our em-
pirical estimates indicate that time-varying in￿ ation risk is a large contributor to return
predictability in nominal bonds, and that time-varying liquidity contributes statistically and
economically signi￿cantly to return predictability in TIPS. We don￿ t ￿nd robust evidence
for time-varying real interest rate risk premia as a source of predictability in government
bond returns in the US over our sample period. However, empirical results for the UK over
a longer sample period indicate time-varying real interest rate risk premia.
We ￿nally investigate the hypothesis that the markets for nominal and in￿ ation-indexed
debt are segmented, leading to relative price ￿ uctuations and return predictability. Recent
3For models of real cash ￿ ow risks in nominal government bonds see Campbell and Viceira (2001),
Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira (2010), and Christensen, Lopez, and Rudebusch (2010).
4research has emphasized the role of limited arbitrage and bond investors￿habitat preferences
to explain predictability in nominal bond returns (Modigliani and Sutch, 1966, Vayanos and
Vila, 2009). It seems plausible that the preference of certain investors￿ such as pension
funds with in￿ ation-indexed liabilities￿ for real bonds, and the preference of others￿ such
as pension funds with nominal liabilities￿ for nominal bonds might lead to imperfect mar-
ket integration between nominal and in￿ ation-indexed markets and might explain generate
return predictability.
We use the outstanding supply of real bonds relative to total government debt as a proxy
for supply shocks in the in￿ ation-indexed bond market in an empirical setup similar to
Greenwood and Vayanos (2008) and Hamilton and Wu (2010). We cannot ￿nd any evidence
for bond supply e⁄ects either in the U.S. or in the UK. One potential interpretation for
this ￿nding could be that governments understand investor demand for the di⁄erent types
of securities and adjust their issuance accordingly, e⁄ectively acting as arbitrageurs between
the two markets.
This paper relates to a number of recent papers that estimate liquidity premia in TIPS.
In recent work, Fleckenstein, Longsta⁄ and Lustig (2010) show that in￿ ation-swaps, which
allow investors to trade on a synthetic measure of breakeven in￿ ation, appear to be mispriced
relative to breakeven in￿ ation in the cash market for TIPS and nominal Treasury bonds. This
signi￿cant mispricing appears to be related to ￿nancing costs to levered investors (Campbell,
Shiller, and Viceira, 2009, and Viceira, 2011), and raises the question why unlevered investors
have not taken advantage of it. We estimate the liquidity di⁄erential between the cash TIPS
market and the cash nominal Treasury bond market over a signi￿cantly longer time period.
Consequently, we ￿nd an even higher pricing di⁄erential due to liquidity.
5Our estimates for the liquidity premium are consistent with the magnitudes estimated in
other recent papers. D￿ Amico, Kim and Wei (2009) estimate a liquidity premium in a struc-
tural model of nominal and real government bonds. Christensen and Gillan (2011) derive a
set of bounds for the liquidity premium in TIPS yields. Haubrich, Pennacchi, and Ritchken
(2011) estimate a term structure model using nominal bond yields, in￿ ation derivatives and
survey in￿ ation expectations. Our approach is new in that we focus on the empirical excess
return predictability in government bonds and to what extent this predictability is driven by
time-varying liquidity versus real cash ￿ ow risks. Moreover, we estimate the liquidity di⁄er-
ential between TIPS and nominal Treasury bonds using a transparent empirical methodology,
which allows for an intuitive interpretation of the time-variation in TIPS liquidity.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section I estimates the liquidity premium in
U.S. TIPS versus nominal bonds using our liquidity proxies. Section II tests the market
segmentation hypothesis in the U.S. and in the UK, and section III tests for time-varying
real interest rate risk and in￿ ation risk premia. Finally, section IV o⁄ers some concluding
remarks.
I Estimating the Liquidity Component of Breakeven
In￿ ation
In perfectly liquid markets, breakeven in￿ ation, or the spread between the yield on a nominal
bond and the yield on an in￿ ation-indexed bond with identical timing of cash ￿ ows, will
re￿ ect investors￿in￿ ation expectations plus any compensation for bearing in￿ ation risk.
6However, if the market for in￿ ation indexed bonds is not as liquid as the markets for nominal
bonds, the yield on in￿ ation-indexed bonds might re￿ ect a liquidity premium relative to the
yield on nominal bonds which narrows observed breakeven in￿ ation.
We pursue an empirical approach to identify the liquidity di⁄erential between the market
for nominal Treasury bonds and TIPS. We estimate the liquidity di⁄erential by regressing
breakeven in￿ ation on measures of liquidity as in Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2010), while
controlling for in￿ ation expectations using di⁄erent proxies. We capture di⁄erent notions of
liquidity through three di⁄erent liquidity proxies: the nominal o⁄-the-run spread, relative
TIPS transaction volume and the di⁄erence between TIPS asset-swap spreads and nominal
U.S. Treasury asset-swap spreads. Since we have data for liquidity proxies only for the U.S.
in the most recent period, this part of our estimation is restricted to the last 10 years of U.S.
experience.
A time-varying market-wide desire to hold only the most liquid securities might drive
part of the liquidity di⁄erential between nominal and in￿ ation-indexed bonds. In a "￿ ight to
liquidity" episode some market participants suddenly prefer highly liquid securities, such as
on-the-run nominal Treasury securities, rather than less liquid securities. We measure this
market wide desire to hold only the most liquid securities by the nominal o⁄-the-run spread.
The Treasury regularly issues new 10 year nominal notes, and the newest 10 year note, also
known as the "on-the-run" note or bond, is considered the most liquidly traded security in
the Treasury bond market. After the Treasury issues a new 10-year note, the prior note
goes ￿o⁄-the-run.￿The o⁄-the-run bond typically trades at a discount over the on-the-run
bond￿ i.e., it trades at a higher yield￿ , despite the fact that it o⁄ers almost identical cash
7￿ ows with a very similar remaining time to maturity (Krishnamurthy, 2002).4
Liquidity developments speci￿c to the TIPS market might also generate a liquidity pre-
mium in TIPS. When TIPS were ￿rst issued in 1997, investors might have had to learn
about TIPS and the market for TIPS took some time to get established. We proxy for this
idea by using the transaction volume of TIPS relative to the transaction volume of Trea-
suries, a measure previously used by Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2010). Fleming and
Krishnan (2009) previously found that trading activity is a good measure of cross-sectional
TIPS liquidity, lending credibility to relative transaction volume as a liquidity proxy in our
time series setup. Following Weill (2007) and others one can also think of TIPS transaction
volume as a measure of illiquidity due to search frictions5.
Finally, we want to capture the cost of arbitraging between TIPS and nominal markets
for a levered investor. Such investors looking for TIPS exposure can either borrow by putting
the TIPS on repo or they can enter into an asset-swap, which requires no initial capital. An
asset-swap is a derivative contract between two parties where one party receives the cash
￿ ows on a particular government bond (e.g. TIPS or nominal) and pays LIBOR plus the
asset-swap spread (ASW), which can be positive or negative. We use the di⁄erence between








4In the search model with partially segmented markets of Vayanos and Wang (2001) short-horizon traders
endogenously concentrate in one asset, making it more liquid. Vayanos (2004) presents a model of ￿nancial
intermediaries and exogenous transaction costs, where preference for liquidity is time-varying and increasing
with volatility.
5See Du¢ e, Garleanu and Pedersen (2005, 2007) and Weill (2007) for models of over-the-counter markets,
in which traders need to search for counterparties and incur opportunity or other costs while doing so.
8A non-levered investor who perceives TIPS to be underpriced relative to nominal Treasuries
might consider entering a zero price portfolio, which is long one dollar of TIPS and short one
dollar of nominal Treasuries. A levered investor could take a similar position by entering one
TIPS asset-swap and going short one nominal Treasury asset-swap. This levered investor
pays the relative spread (1), which is typically positive, for the privilege of not having to put
up any initial capital. Since the levered investor holds a portfolio with a theoretical price
of zero, this spread re￿ ects the current and expected relative ￿nancing costs of holding the
bond position. Empirically, the asset-swap spread variable captures extraordinary events
during the ￿nancial crisis.6
As a robustness analysis, we also consider the spread between synthetic breakeven in-
￿ ation and cash breakeven in￿ ation. Synthetic breakeven in￿ ation is the ￿xed rate in a
zero-coupon in￿ ation swap. Zero-coupon in￿ ation swaps are contracts where one party pays
the other cumulative CPI in￿ ation at the end of maturity in exchange for a pre-determined
￿xed rate. Entering a zero-coupon in￿ ation swap does not require any initial capital, sim-
ilarly to entering a TIPS asset-swap and going short a nominal Treasury asset-swap. The
di⁄erence between synthetic breakeven (or breakeven in￿ ation in the in￿ ation swap mar-
ket) and cash breakeven is therefore the ￿ ip side of the asset-swap spread (Viceira 2011)
and should be empirically similar to ASW
spread
n;t : We consider the asset-swap spread as our
benchmark variable, since it most closely captures the relative ￿nancing cost and specialness
of TIPS over nominal Treasuries.
The asset-swap spread is likely related to specialness of nominal Treasuries in the repo
market and the lack of specialness of TIPS, which can vary over time7. These di⁄erences in
6See Campbell, Shiller, and Viceira (2009) for an account of liquidity events during the Fall of 2008.
7In private email conversations Michael Fleming and Neel Krishnan report that for the period Feb. 4,
9specialness might be the result of variation in the relative liquidity of securities, which make
some securities easier to liquidate and hence more attractive to hold than others.
The liquidity di⁄erential between the nominal bond market and the in￿ ation-indexed
bond market can also give rise to a liquidity risk premium: If the liquidity of in￿ ation-
indexed bonds deteriorates during periods when investors would like to sell, as in ￿￿ ight to
liquidity￿episodes, risk averse investors will demand a liquidity risk premium for holding
these bonds (Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen 2005, Acharya and Pedersen 2005).
While the relative transaction volume of TIPS likely only captures the current ease of
trading TIPS and therefore a liquidity premium, the o⁄-the-run spread, and the asset-swap
spread are likely to represent both the level of liquidity and liquidity risk. Our estimated liq-
uidity premium is therefore likely to represent a combination of current ease of trading TIPS
versus nominal U.S. Treasuries and the risk that the liquidity of TIPS might deteriorate.
In order to isolate the liquidity component in breakeven in￿ ation, we consider the di⁄er-
ence between breakeven in￿ ation and survey long-term in￿ ation expectations, which should
in principle not re￿ ect time-varying in￿ ation expectations. Survey long-term in￿ ation ex-
pectations are extremely stable over our sample period and in order to take into account the
possibility that more short-term in￿ ation expectations enter into breakeven, we also control
for the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI). The CFNAI is based on economic
activity measures and provides a reliable in￿ ation forecast over a 12 month horizon (Stock
and Watson, 1999). The CFNAI should especially take into account ￿ uctuations in in￿ ation
expectations that are related to the aggregate economy.
2004 to the end of 2010 average repo specialness was as follows. On-the-run coupon securities: 35 bps;
o⁄-the-run coupon securities: 6 bps; T-Bills: 13 bps; TIPS: 0 bps.
10A Bond Notation and De￿nitions
We denote by y$
n;t and yTIPS
n;t the log (or continuously compounded) yield with n periods
to maturity for nominal and in￿ ation-indexed bonds, respectively. We use the superscript
TIPS to denote this quantity for both U.S. and UK in￿ ation-indexed bonds. We denote
SPF survey in￿ ation expectations by ￿SPF:







Log excess returns on nominal and in￿ ation-indexed zero-coupon n-period bonds held for



























Note that this is essentially the return on a portfolio long long-term nominal bonds and short
long-term in￿ ation-indexed bonds. This portfolio will have positive returns when breakeven
in￿ ation declines, and negative returns when it increases.

















n;t = bn;t ￿ b1;t: (8)
In￿ ation-indexed bonds are commonly quoted in terms of real yields, but since xrTIPS
n;t+1
is an excess return over the real short rate it can be interpreted as a real or nominal excess






At times when TIPS are relatively less liquid than nominal bonds we would expect TIPS to
trade at a discount and the TIPS yield to increase relative to nominal yields. To account for
this premium, we estimate the following regression for breakeven in￿ ation:
bn;t ￿ ￿
SPF = a1 + a2Xt + a3CFNAIt + "t; (9)
where Xt is a vector containing our three liquidity proxies: the o⁄-the-run spread, the relative
TIPS transactions volume and the di⁄erence between TIPS and nominal asset-swap spreads.
In (9) we would expect variables that indicate less liquidity in the TIPS market, such
as the o⁄-the-run spread and the asset-swap spread, to enter negatively. Higher transaction
volume in the TIPS market indicates that TIPS are easily traded and therefore it should
enter positively.
12The asset-swap spread re￿ ects the ￿nancing costs that a levered investor incurs from
holding TIPS instead of nominal bonds of similar maturity. If the marginal investor in TIPS
is such a levered investor, we would expect breakeven in￿ ation to fall approximately one for
one with the asset-swap spread.
Our liquidity variables are normalized in such a way that they go to zero in a world of
perfect liquidity. When liquidity is perfect the o⁄-the-run spread and the asset-swap spread
should equal zero. The transaction volume is normalized so that its maximum is equal to
zero. That is, we assume that the liquidity premium attributable to low transaction volume
was negligible during the period of 2004-2007. The CFNAI is constructed to have an average
value of zero and a standard deviation of one.
We obtain the TIPS liquidity premium as the negative of the variation in bn;t ￿ ￿SPF
explained by the liquidity variables, while controlling for the CFNAI as a proxy of short-term
in￿ ation expectations. The estimated relative liquidity premium in TIPS yields then equals
^ Ln;t = ￿^ a2Xt; (10)
where ^ a2 is the vector of slope estimates in (9). Thus an increase in ^ Ln;t re￿ ects a reduction
in the liquidity of TIPS relative to nominal Treasury bonds.
While our liquidity estimate most likely re￿ ects liquidity ￿ uctuations in both nominal
bonds and in TIPS, we have to make an assumption in computing liquidity-adjusted TIPS
yields. We can either assume that all of the liquidity premium is in nominal bonds, in
which case we do not need to correct TIPS yields at all. Or we can assume that all of
the liquidity premium is due to TIPS, which yields our liquidity-adjusted TIPS yields. To
13allow comparison between these two possibilities, we construct liquidity-adjusted TIPS yields
under the assumption that the liquidity premium Ln;t is entirely attributable to time-varying
liquidity in TIPS rather than in nominal bonds. We refer to the following variables as





n;t ￿ ^ Ln;t; (11)
b
adj
n;t = bn;t + ^ Ln;t: (12)
C Yield Data
We use data on constant-maturity in￿ ation-indexed and nominal yields both in the U.S. and
in the UK. In￿ ation-indexed bonds are bonds whose principal adjusts automatically with the
evolution of a consumer price index, which in the U.S. is the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U)
and in the UK is the Retail Price Index (RPI). The coupons are equal to the in￿ ation-
adjusted principal on the bond times a ￿xed coupon rate. Thus the coupons on these bonds
also adjust with in￿ ation.8
For the U.S. we use the Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007) and Gurkaynak, Sack, and
Wright (2010, GSW henceforth) data set. GSW have constructed a zero-coupon o⁄-the-run
yield curve starting in January 1961 for nominal bonds and for TIPS starting in January
1999 by ￿tting a smoothed yield curve. Our empirical tests will focus on the 10-year nominal
and real yields, because this maturity bracket has the longest and most continuous history
8There are further details such as in in￿ ation lags in principal updating and tax treatment of the coupons
that slightly complicate the pricing of these bonds. More details on TIPS can be found in Viceira (2001),
Roll (2004), Campbell, Shiller, and Viceira (2009) and Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2010). Campbell and
Shiller (1996) o⁄er a discussion of the taxation of in￿ ation-indexed bonds.
14of TIPS outstanding. We measure U.S. in￿ ation with the all-urban seasonally adjusted CPI,
and the short-term nominal interest rate with the 3 month T-bill rate from the Fama-Bliss
riskless interest rate ￿le from CRSP.
While the nominal principal value of TIPS increases with in￿ ation, it is guaranteed
to never fall below its original nominal face value. As a consequence of this a recently
issued TIPS, whose nominal face value is close to its original nominal face values, has a
de￿ ation option built into it that is more valuable than that in a less recently issued TIPS
with the same time to maturity remaining. Grishchenko, Vanden, and Zhang (2011) study
the de￿ ationary expectations re￿ ected in the pricing of the TIPS de￿ ation ￿ oor. During
normal times the probability of a severe and prolonged de￿ ation is negligible so that those
bonds trade at identical prices, as discussed in Wright (2009). Wright (2009) also points
out some of the dramatic price discrepancies between recently issued and seasoned ￿ve-year
TIPS observed during the ￿nancial crisis and attributes them to the increased value of the
de￿ ation option during the ￿nancial crisis. In Appendix Figure A.1 we illustrate the GSW
10 year TIPS yield together with yields of 10 year TIPS issued at di⁄erent reference CPI.
A lower reference CPI indicates that the de￿ ation option in a particular issuance is less
valuable. Since the GSW yield is closest to TIPS yields with low reference CPI, we conclude
that the GSW yield does not re￿ ect a signi￿cant de￿ ation option.
For the UK we use zero-coupon yield curves from the Bank of England. Anderson and
Sleath (2001) describe the spline-based techniques used to estimate the yield curves. Nominal
yields are available starting in 1970 for 0.5 to 20 years to maturity. Real yields are available
starting in 1985 for 2.5 to 25 years to maturity. We use the 20-year maturity in our tests
because 20-year nominal and real yields are available from 1985, while for instance 10-year
15real yields are available only since 1991.9 In￿ ation is measured by the non seasonally ad-
justed Retail Price Index, which serves as the measure of in￿ ation for in￿ ation-indexed bond
payouts. UK three month Treasury bill rates are from the Bank of England (IUMAJNB).
Since neither the U.S. nor the UK governments issue in￿ ation-indexed bills, we need
to resort to an empirical procedure to build a hypothetical short-term real interest rate to
compute excess returns. We follow the procedure described in P￿ ueger and Viceira (2011)
and use the ￿tted ex-post real return on a nominal three month T-bill. The predictive
regressions are reported in Appendix Table A.I. For simplicity we assume a zero liquidity
premium on one-quarter real bonds. Appendix Table A.VI shows that our results are robust
to replacing TIPS returns in excess of our estimated real interest rate with nominal TIPS
returns in excess of the nominal T-bill rate.
Finally, although our yield data sets are available at a monthly frequency, we focus on
quarterly overlapping bond returns in order to reduce the in￿ uence of high-frequency noise
in observed in￿ ation and short-term nominal interest rate volatility in our tests.
We use the median 10 year forecast of CPI in￿ ation from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters, consistent with the 10 year maturity of U.S. breakeven. SPF survey expectations
are available at a quarterly frequency and are released towards the end of the middle month
of the quarter. Our breakeven series is monthly and we create a monthly series of the
di⁄erential between breakeven in￿ ation and survey in￿ ation expectations by subtracting the
most recently released in￿ ation forecast.
9For some months the 20 year yields are not available and instead we use the longest maturity available.
The maturity used for the 20 year yield series drops down to 16.5 years for a short period in 1991.
16D Data on Liquidity Proxies
We obtain the 10 year nominal o⁄-the-run spread by subtracting a 10 year nominal on-the-
run yield from Bloomberg from the GSW 10 year o⁄-the-run yield.10
We obtain Primary Dealers￿transaction volumes for TIPS and nominal Treasury secu-
rities from the New York Federal Reserve FR-2004 survey. We construct our measure of







t denotes the av-
erage weekly transactions volume over the past month and Trans$
t the corresponding ￿gure
for nominal bonds. For Trans$ we use the transaction volume of government coupon se-
curities with at least 6 (before 2001) or 7 (from 2001) years to maturity. We choose the
transaction volume series for coupon bonds with a long time to maturity because we are
aiming to capture the di⁄erential liquidity of TIPS with respect to 10 year nominal bonds.
Including all maturities or even T-bills would also re￿ ect liquidity of short-term instruments
versus long-term instruments. We then smooth the measure of relative transaction volume
over the past three months because we think of it as capturing secular learning e⁄ects rather
than capturing short-term ￿ uctuations in liquidity.11 We normalize the relative transaction
volume so that its maximal value is equal to zero.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
10The on-the-run data is from Bloomberg (USGG10YR). We subtract the on-the-run yield to maturity for
a generic 10 year nominal Treasury bond from the GSW o⁄-the-run par yield for a nominal 10 year Treasury
bond.
11In 2001 the Federal Reserve changed the maturity cuto⁄s for which the transaction volumes are reported.
Before 6/28/2001 we use the transaction volume of Treasuries with 6 or more years to maturity while starting
6/28/2001 we use the transaction volume of Treasuries with 7 or more years to maturity. The series after
the break is scaled so that the growth in Trans$ from 6/21/2001 to 6/28/2001 is equal to the growth in
transaction volume of all government coupon securities.
17We obtain asset-swap spread data from Barclays Live. We only have data on ASW
spread
n;t
from January 2004, and set it to its January 2004 value of 28 bps before that date. We
obtain 10 year zero-coupon in￿ ation-swap data from Bloomberg (USDSW10Y) from July
2004.
Figure 1 shows our liquidity variables. The on-the-run o⁄-the-run spread was high during
the late 1990s, declined during 2005-2007, and jumped to over 50 bps during the ￿nancial
crisis. The relative transaction volume rises linearly through 2004, stabilizes and declines
modestly after the ￿nancial crisis. This pattern suggests that the liquidity premium due to
the novelty of TIPS should have been modest in the period since 2004. Interestingly, shortly
after the Treasury recon￿rmed its commitment to the TIPS issuance program in mid-2003
(Bitsberger, 2003) the relative TIPS trading volume increased substantially and synthetic
markets developed.
Finally, the asset-swap spread variable ASW
spread
n;t varies within a relatively narrow range
of 21 basis point to 41 basis points from January 2004 through December 2006, and it rises
sharply during the ￿nancial crisis, reaching 130 bps in December 2008. That is, before the
crisis ￿nancing a long position in TIPS was about 30 basis more expensive than ￿nancing
a long position in nominal Treasury bonds, but this cost di⁄erential rose dramatically after
the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008. Campbell, Shiller, and Viceira (2009) argue
that the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September of 2008 had a signi￿cant e⁄ect on
liquidity in the TIPS market, because Lehman Brothers had been very active in the TIPS
market. The unwinding of its large TIPS inventory in the weeks following its bankruptcy,
combined with a sudden increase in the cost of ￿nancing long positions in TIPS appears to
have induced an unexpected downward price pressure in the TIPS market. This led to a
18liquidity-induced sharp tightening of breakeven in￿ ation associated with a widening of the
TIPS asset-swap spread. The asset-swap spread ASW
spread
n;t and the di⁄erential between
synthetic and cash breakeven in￿ ation track very closely, as expected.
[TABLE I ABOUT HERE]
Table I shows summary statistics for bond spreads and excess returns as well as liquidity
variables. Over our sample period breakeven in￿ ation has averaged 2:25% per annum (p.a.)
and TIPS yields have averaged 2:41% p.a. At 2:47% p.a., survey in￿ ation expectations
have been higher than breakeven in￿ ation on average. If breakeven in￿ ation re￿ ects only
investors￿in￿ ation expectations plus perhaps an in￿ ation risk premium, this is surprising
unless the in￿ ation risk premium has been substantially negative over this period. It is even
more surprising in light of the ￿nding in Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2007) that the Survey of
Professional Forecasters tends to under predict in￿ ation when in￿ ation is low, which makes
breakeven in￿ ation appear even lower relative to plausible in￿ ation expectations. Simply
comparing average breakeven in￿ ation to average survey in￿ ation expectations therefore
suggests that there may have been a substantial liquidity premium in TIPS yields relative
to nominal Treasury yields, or a substantive negative in￿ ation risk premium.
The realized average annualized log excess returns on TIPS have been equal to 4:66%
p.a., exceeding the log excess returns on nominal government bonds by 48 basis points (bps).
The average log excess returns on UK in￿ ation-indexed bonds, on the other hand, have been
substantially smaller at only 2:14% p.a. over the longer sample period from 1985.4 to 2009.12.
19E Estimation Results
We estimate the relative liquidity premium in TIPS yields in Table II according to regression
(9). We add liquidity proxies one at a time. Table II(4) presents our benchmark estimate
with all liquidity proxies and controlling for the CFNAI for our full sample period (1999.3-
2010.12) and also for an early period that excludes the ￿nancial crisis (1993.3-2006.12).
[TABLE II ABOUT HERE]
Table II shows coe¢ cients whose signs are consistent with intuition and statistically
signi￿cant. The liquidity measures explain a signi￿cant portion of the variability of the
spread between breakeven and survey in￿ ation expectations. The o⁄-the-run spread alone
obtains an R2 of 57%, as shown in Table II(1). The R2 increases with the inclusion of
every additional liquidity variable to 62% in Table II(3), indicating that each of the controls
helps explain the liquidity premium on TIPS. Our proxy for short-term expected in￿ ation,
the CFNAI, enters as expected positively, and further increases the R2 by another four
percentage points. Appendix Table A.II shows that each variable alone also explains a
signi￿cant fraction of the variation in breakeven in￿ ation.
Breakeven in￿ ation moves negatively with the o⁄-the-run spread in Treasury bonds with
a large coe¢ cient, suggesting that TIPS yields re￿ ect a strong market-wide liquidity compo-
nent. A one standard deviation move in the o⁄-the-run spread of 11 bps tends to go along
with a decrease in breakeven of 13 bps in our benchmark estimation (1:19 ￿ 11 bps). These
magnitudes are substantial relative to average breakeven of 225 bps. This empirical ￿nding
indicates that while during a ￿ ight-to-liquidity episode investors rush into nominal on-the-run
20US Treasuries, they do not buy US TIPS to the same degree. This is especially interesting
given that both types of bonds are fully backed by the same issuer, the US Treasury.
The negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient on relative TIPS trading volume indicates that the
impact of search frictions on in￿ ation-indexed bond prices were exacerbated during the early
period of in￿ ation-indexed bond issuance, when maybe only a small number of sophisticated
investors had a good understanding of the mechanics and pricing of these new bonds. As
TIPS trading volume relative to nominal Treasury trading volume increased, TIPS yields fell
relative to nominal bond yields. Our empirical estimates suggest that an increase in relative
trading volume from its minimum in 1999 to its maximum in 2004 was associated with an
economically signi￿cant decrease in the TIPS liquidity premium of 38 bps.
The freely estimated coe¢ cient on the asset-swap spread di⁄erential at -0.64 is some-
what smaller in magnitude than the theoretical value of -1. The negative and economically
signi￿cant coe¢ cient on the asset-swap spread suggests the relevance of liquidity factors in
explaining the sharp fall in breakeven during the ￿nancial crisis, since the asset-swap spread
di⁄erential behaves almost like a dummy variable that spikes up during the ￿nancial crisis.
During the ￿nancial crisis securities markets were severely disrupted and the buyers and
sellers of asset-swaps may not have acted as the marginal buyers and sellers of TIPS. A
regression coe¢ cient with a smaller magnitude allows for the possibility that the marginal
TIPS investor only faced a fraction of the ￿nancing costs re￿ ected in asset-swap markets.
When we estimate the regression with the synthetic minus cash breakeven spread instead
of the asset swap spread, we obtain very similar results with a coe¢ cient on the synthetic
minus cash breakeven spread even closer to the theoretical value of -1.
The constant in Table II can be interpreted as the di⁄erential between liquidity-adjusted
21breakeven in￿ ation and survey in￿ ation forecasts over our sample period. In our benchmark
speci￿cation, liquidity-adjusted breakeven exceeds survey in￿ ation expectations by 50 bps
on average but this di⁄erential varies between 21 bps and 61 bps depending on the regression
speci￿cation. Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2007) ￿nd that the SPF tends to under predict in￿ ation
when in￿ ation is low, while the Michigan survey12 of consumers￿in￿ ation expectations is
on average unbiased. Unfortunately, the Michigan survey is designed to forecast in￿ ation
over the coming year, whereas we are interested in 10 year forecasts. The level of the
Michigan forecast over our sample period is indeed higher by about 40 bps than the SPF
survey, suggesting that our estimation procedure yields a plausible average level for the TIPS
liquidity premium.
While bond market liquidity was especially variable during the ￿nancial crisis, we also ￿nd
a strong relationship between breakeven and liquidity proxies during the pre-crisis period. In
Table II(6) and II(7) we see that before 2007 liquidity variables explain 49% of the variation
in the spread between breakeven in￿ ation and survey in￿ ation expectations and that the
o⁄-the-run spread enters with a strong negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient.
Since some of the liquidity variables are persistent, one might be concerned about spuri-
ousness in Table II. If there does not exist a slope vector so that the regression residuals are
stationary, Ordinary Least Squares is quite likely to produce spurious results with arti￿cially
large R20s and t-statistics (Granger and Newbold, 1974, Phillips, 1986, Hamilton, 1994). To
evaluate the potential importance of this problem, we test the regression residuals for a unit
root using augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. Table II shows that we can reject the presence
of a unit root for all regression speci￿cations in Table II at conventional signi￿cance levels.
12Available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/MICH/downloaddata?cid=32455.
22We also estimate the regression (9) with all variables expressed in quarterly changes. Table
A.III in the Appendix shows that the regression results in quarterly changes are very similar
to the regression results in levels, further alleviating spuriousness concerns.
Our estimation of the liquidity premium might rely on extrapolation outside the range
of historically observed liquidity events. The e⁄ect of our liquidity proxies on the liquidity
premium in TIPS might be nonlinear and this might especially matter during events of
extreme liquidity or extreme illiquidity. Appendix Tables A.IV and A.V report additional
results including interaction terms. We ￿nd that including interaction terms yields a very
similar time series for liquidity at a slightly lower level, while the return predictability results
remain unaltered.
We also report liquidity regressions including the TIPS bid-ask spread as an additional
natural liquidity proxy in Appendix Table A.IV. We ￿nd that the bid-ask spread does not
enter, suggesting that our other liquidity proxies already incorporate the time-varying round-
trip cost of buying and selling a TIPS.13
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Figure 2 plots the liquidity premium as estimated in the benchmark regression in Table
II (4), where we obtain the liquidity premium according to equation (10). Intuitively, the
liquidity premium equals the negative of the ￿tted value after taking out the constant and
the variation explained by the in￿ ation forecasting variable CFNAI. We obtain an average
spread due to liquidity of 65 bps with a standard deviation of 25bps (see Table IV). Although
13We are grateful to George Pennachi for making his proprietary data on TIPS bid-ask spreads avaialble
to us.
23this average is high, one must take into account that it re￿ ects periods of very low liquidity
in this market. Figure 2 shows a high liquidity premium in the early 2000￿ s (about 70-100
bps), but a much lower liquidity premium between 2004 and 2007 (25-70 bps). The premium
shoots up again beyond 150 bps during the crisis, and ￿nally comes down to 50-70 bps after
the crisis.
The time series of our liquidity premium is consistent with the ￿ndings in D￿ Amico, Kim
and Wei (2008) but in addition we provide an estimate of the liquidity premium during
and after the ￿nancial crisis. In recent work Fleckenstein, Longsta⁄ and Lustig (2010) show
evidence that in￿ ation-swaps, which allow investors to trade on in￿ ation without putting
up any initial capital, appear to be mispriced relative to breakeven in￿ ation in the cash
market for TIPS and nominal Treasury bonds. Their series of average mispricing between
synthetic and cash breakeven in￿ ation is re￿ ected in our "Synthetic-Cash" variable in Table
II(5). The o⁄-the-run spread and TIPS relative transaction volume enter in addition to the
mispricing between synthetic and cash breakeven. Consequently, we estimate that the size
of the liquidity di⁄erential in the cash market for TIPS and nominal Treasury bonds is even
larger than the size of the mispricing in the in￿ ation swap market.
The large liquidity premium in TIPS is puzzling given that bid-ask spreads on TIPS are
small. Haubrich, Pennacchi and Ritchken (2010) report bid-ask spreads for TIPS between
0.5 bps up to a high of 10 bps during the ￿nancial crisis. It seems implausible that the
liquidity premium in TIPS yields simply serves to amortize transaction costs of a long-term
investor14. As argued before, TIPS should typically be held by buy-and-hold investors. In
a simple model of liquidity, such as given in Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005), a
14See also Wright (2009).
24transaction cost of 10 bps can only justify a liquidity premium of 1bp for a 10 year TIPS
that is held by a buy-and-hold investor.
It is instructive to compare the liquidity premium for TIPS to the liquidity premium for
o⁄-the-run nominal Treasuries, adjusted for the likely time to convergence of the liquidity
di⁄erential. Table I shows that the average o⁄-the-run spread over our sample period is 21
bps. However, the on-the-run o⁄-the-run liquidity di⁄erential can be expected to converge
when the new on-the-run nominal 10 year bond is issued, that is within 6 months. Thus
the average annualized return on the liquidity di⁄erential between 10 year on-the-run and
o⁄-the-run nominal Treasury bonds is 21 ￿ 20 bps= 420 bps. On the other hand, the TIPS
liquidity premium might converge signi￿cantly more slowly. An extreme assumption might
be that the TIPS liquidity premium persists for 10 years for a 10 year TIPS, in which case
the average annualized return on TIPS liquidity is 65 bps. These simple calculations show
that the estimated liquidity premium in TIPS, though puzzlingly large when compared to
bid-ask spreads, gives rise to liquidity returns which are not unreasonable when compared
to those on o⁄-the-run nominal Treasuries.
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Figure 3 shows liquidity-adjusted breakeven in￿ ation. The benchmark estimation sug-
gests an average liquidity-adjusted breakeven over our sample period of 2.90% with a stan-
dard deviation of 26bps (see Table IV). Figure 3 shows that liquidity-adjusted breakeven was
substantially more stable during our sample period than raw breakeven. Both raw breakeven
and liquidity-adjusted breakeven exhibited a drop during the ￿nancial crisis but this drop
was signi￿cantly smaller for liquidity-adjusted breakeven. Our estimation therefore suggests
25that while investors￿long-term in￿ ation expectations fell during the ￿nancial crisis, there was
never a period when investors feared massive de￿ ation. Instead, we ￿nd that the extreme
fall in raw breakeven in￿ ation was partly due to market disruptions.
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 4 plots liquidity-adjusted TIPS yields assuming that the estimated di⁄erential
liquidity premium is entirely due to TIPS. The ￿gure shows that if TIPS had remained as
liquid as nominal Treasuries their yields would have remained relatively more stable during
the ￿nancial crisis. Our estimation attributes the dramatic spike in TIPS yields to 3.5% in
the fall of 2008 partly to liquidity and partly to a moderate increase in real long-term yields.
II Time-Variation of Real Interest Rate and In￿ ation
Risk Premia
A Predictive regressions with liquidity-adjusted yields and re-
turns
This section provides new empirical evidence on excess bond return predictability using
liquidity-adjusted returns on TIPS and breakeven in￿ ation, and returns on nominal Treasury
bonds. We interpret our predictability regressions as evidence of time variation in real
interest rate risk premia, in￿ ation risk premia, and liquidity risk premia. The following
section III investigates whether bond return predictability could instead be the result of the
26supply e⁄ects suggested in the preferred habitat model with limits to arbitrage of Greenwood
and Vayanos (2009), but it does not ￿nd strong evidence of such e⁄ects in our sample period.
We decompose government bond excess returns into returns due to real interest rates,
returns due to changing in￿ ation expectations, and returns due to liquidity. We then test for
predictability in each component separately. Predictability in real bond excess returns would
indicate a time-varying real interest rate risk premium, while predictability in liquidity-
adjusted breakeven returns should indicate a time-varying in￿ ation risk premium. Pre-
dictability in the liquidity component of TIPS returns would indicate a time-varying liquidity
risk premium.
Replacing the TIPS yield by the liquidity-adjusted TIPS yield (11)￿ assuming once again
that the liquidity di⁄erential is entirely attributable to TIPS￿ and breakeven in￿ ation by


















The return on TIPS due to illiquidity is given by
r
L
n;t+1 = ￿(n ￿ 1)Ln￿1;t+1 + nLn;t: (15)
Campbell and Shiller (1996) showed that the nominal term spread can predict excess
returns on long-term nominal bonds. P￿ ueger and Viceira (2011) in addition found that
27TIPS returns are predicted by the TIPS term spread and that breakeven in￿ ation returns
are predicted by the breakeven term spread but do not adjust for liquidity. Table III shows
similar predictability regression for liquidity-adjusted returns. Table III reports Newey-West
standard errors with three lags to control for time-series autocorrelation in the regression
errors. We also report one-sided bootstrap p-values to account for the fact that liquidity is
estimated and is therefore only known with error. We use a non-parametric block bootstrap
with block length 24 months and 2000 replications. See Horowitz (2001) for a survey of
bootstrap methods.
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The ￿rst two columns in Table III show that after adjusting for liquidity, we cannot
￿nd any evidence for predictability in real bond excess returns. While P￿ ueger and Viceira
(2011) found that the TIPS term spread predicts TIPS excess returns15, we cannot reject the
null hypothesis of no predictability in liquidity-adjusted TIPS excess returns at conventional
signi￿cance levels. Said di⁄erently, we cannot reject the expectations hypothesis of the term
structure of interest rates in real bonds. This ￿nding of no predictability might of course
partly be due to our short sample period in the US and only longer time series may be able
to tell.
On the other hand, the evidence for predictability in liquidity-adjusted breakeven excess
returns is strong. The liquidity-adjusted breakeven term spread predicts breakeven excess
returns signi￿cantly with a large coe¢ cient. This provides support for the hypothesis that
nominal bond term spreads partly re￿ ect time-varying in￿ ation risk premia and that time-
varying in￿ ation risk premia are a source of predictability in nominal bond excess returns.
15Over our slightly updated sample period the evidence becomes marginally insigni￿cant, see Table V.
28Remarkably liquidity does not predict liquidity-adjusted real bond excess returns or
breakeven excess returns and therefore does not appear to be related to fundamental cash-
￿ ow risk. This ￿nding suggests that the liquidity premium does not capture time-varying
in￿ ation risk, even though we did not explicitly control for time-varying in￿ ation risk when
estimating the liquidity premium.
The last column of Table III shows that the liquidity return rL
n;t+1 is highly predictable
from lagged liquidity Ln;t with a large and highly signi￿cant regression coe¢ cient. Return-
predictability in TIPS excess returns therefore is partly due to a time-varying and predictable
liquidity premium. The e⁄ect of the liquidity premium on returns is such that when liquidity
in the TIPS market is scarce, TIPS enjoy a higher expected return relatively to nominal
bonds, rewarding investors who are willing to invest into a temporarily less liquid market.
Table III uses excess returns on TIPS over our hypothetical real short rate. However,
the return predictability results in Table III hold up if instead we consider nominal returns
on TIPS in excess of the nominal short rate, as shown in Appendix Table A.VI.
B Economic Signi￿cance of Risk Premia
Table IV shows statistics to illustrate the economic signi￿cance of di⁄erent bond risk pre-
mia.16 As discussed in the introduction, US TIPS enjoyed higher excess returns than US
nominal bonds over our sample period, so US breakeven excess returns are negative on aver-
16Our average return calculations are based on log returns with no variance adjustments for Jensen￿ s
inequality. We compute CAPM betas using the stock market as the proxy for the wealth portfolio. The
US excess stock return is the log quarterly return on the value-weighted CRSP index, rebalanced annually,
in excess of our log 3 month interest rate. The UK excess stock return similarly is computed as the log
quarterly total return on the FTSE in excess of our log 3 month interest rate.
29age over our sample period. Our estimates explain the negative breakeven excess return with
a positive return due to liquidity, which is large at 1.01% p.a.17 After adjusting for liquidity,
we obtain a positive breakeven in￿ ation return of 53 bps p.a. on average. At the same time,
our estimates imply that even controlling for liquidity the average return on TIPS has been
positive at 3.66% p.a.
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The second column in the panel shows CAPM betas of raw and liquidity-adjusted bond
excess returns. The positive and signi￿cant beta on liquidity implies that TIPS tend to
become illiquid relative to nominal Treasury bonds￿ or conversely, Treasury bonds become
more liquid relative to TIPS￿ at times when the stock valuations fall. The strong positive
covariation of our liquidity estimate with stock returns suggests that investors should expect
to earn a premium on TIPS for bearing systematic variation in liquidity.
Consistent with this notion, Appendix Table A.VII shows that the market alpha of liq-
uidity returns is small and insigni￿cant over our full sample period. This table also shows
that while during the pre-crisis period liquidity returns appear to have no market exposure
and substantial alpha, inclusion of the ￿nancial crisis shows that liquidity returns are highly
systematic and do not o⁄er signi￿cant alpha. It therefore seems that positive liquidity re-
turns compensate TIPS holders for the risk that TIPS become less liquid during dramatic
drops in the stock market. Appendix Table A.VIII also shows that TIPS liquidity returns are
not related to innovations in the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor, which captures liquidity
in the stock market, or to the Fama-French factors.
17The average liquidity-adjusted excess log return on TIPS and the log return on liquidity add up to the
average excess log return on TIPS up to rounding.
30The CAPM betas of liquidity-adjusted breakeven excess returns and liquidity-adjusted
TIPS returns are negative but insigni￿cant at -0.09 and -0.11, respectively.18 These negative
betas imply that on average real interest rates and in￿ ation expectations are pro-cyclical
during our sample period. Procyclical behavior of real interest rates and low in￿ ation risk
makes all Treasury bonds, whether nominal or in￿ ation-indexed, safe assets that provide
investors with sizable diversi￿cation bene￿ts relative to stocks in the framework of Campbell,
Sunderam, and Viceira (2011).
In order to understand the economic signi￿cance of the estimated return predictability, we
now calculate the volatilities of predicted excess returns and compare them to the variability
of realized bond excess returns. The expected liquidity-adjusted breakeven returns, the
expected liquidity-adjusted TIPS returns and expected liquidity returns are the ￿tted values
from Table III(2), III(4), and III(5). We obtain the expected excess returns on nominal
bonds, TIPS and breakeven in￿ ation similarly as ￿tted values of the respective excess return
onto the breakeven and TIPS term spreads.
The third column of Panel B in Table IV shows that liquidity-adjusted breakeven excess
returns have the most volatile predictable component, followed by liquidity-adjusted TIPS
excess returns and liquidity returns. Time-varying expected liquidity returns can account
for 3% of the variance of realized TIPS returns, while expected returns on liquidity-adjusted
TIPS are more variable, explaining 6% of the variance of realized TIPS returns. While we
are not able to reject the null hypothesis of no predictability in liquidity-adjusted TIPS
excess returns in Table III, the ￿tted time-varying real interest rate risk premium appears
18While raw breakeven returns have a large and negative CAPM beta, adjusting for liquidity reduces
the magnitude and signi￿cance of this CAPM beta. These results suggest that the negative in￿ ation risk
premium estimated by Campbell, Sunderam and Viceira (2010) over our sample period might have been
partly caused by systematic variation in the relative liquidity of TIPS and nominal Treasury bonds.
31quantitatively more volatile than the ￿tted liquidity premium.
Time-variation in expected excess returns on liquidity-adjusted breakeven in￿ ation and
TIPS can account for 7% and 4% of the sample variability of realized nominal bond returns,
respectively. These relative magnitudes suggest that the time-varying in￿ ation risk premium
is quantitatively important for nominal bond excess return predictability.
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Figure 5A illustrates the time series of the ￿tted US expected excess returns. We label the
expected liquidity excess return as a liquidity risk premium, the expected liquidity-adjusted
breakeven return as an in￿ ation risk premium and expected liquidity-adjusted TIPS returns
as a real rate risk premium. Figure 5A shows quarterly expected returns in annualized units.
While the magnitudes may appear large, we need to bear in mind that Table III predicts
quarterly returns and not returns over the next year. During the period of 2000 to 2006 the
in￿ ation risk premium was small or negative. During the period of high oil prices in 2008 the
in￿ ation risk premium was positive but subsequently fell to almost -10% at the beginning of
2009, precisely at a time when the real rate risk premium increased sharply. The liquidity
risk premium on TIPS was large in the early 2000￿ s, but declined steadily during the decade,
with the exception of a pronounced spike during the ￿nancial crisis in the Fall of 2008.
A negative in￿ ation risk premium in 2009 indicates that investors considered the nominal
component of bond returns safe, so further economic deterioration was anticipated to go
along with low in￿ ation rather than high in￿ ation. A large and positive real interest rate
risk premium during the same time period indicates that real bonds were considered risky,
32so a deepening of the recession was likely to go along with high long-term interest rates.
Panel C in Table IV shows similar statistics for UK excess bond returns over the longer
sample period 1985-2010. Due to data constraints we are not able to compute a liquidity-
adjustment for the UK. However, liquidity-adjustments in the UK bond market are likely
to be less signi￿cant than in the US bond market. UK in￿ ation-linked bonds have been
issued for a signi￿cantly longer period and therefore it appears plausible that initial learning
should a⁄ect only a small portion of their time series. Moreover, neither UK nominal nor
in￿ ation-indexed bonds are likely to enjoy the same extraordinary liquidity bene￿ts as US
nominal Treasury bonds, suggesting that ￿￿ ight-to-liquidity￿e⁄ects should be less signi￿cant
in generating a liquidity di⁄erential between in￿ ation-indexed and nominal bonds in the UK.
We ￿nd an average excess return on UK in￿ ation-indexed bonds of 2.15% p.a. Average
breakeven excess returns were positive in the UK, just like liquidity-adjusted breakeven
excess returns in the US.
The CAPM beta of UK in￿ ation-indexed bonds at 0.14 is positive and statistically sig-
ni￿cant, while the CAPM beta of breakeven in￿ ation is essentially zero over the full sample.
The betas on UK bonds indicate that on average in￿ ation-indexed bonds, and to some de-
gree nominal bonds, have been risky over the time period under consideration. On the other
hand, breakeven in￿ ation has not exhibited any systematic risk. However, the UK breakeven
betas hide important variation across sub-periods. In Appendix Table A.VII, we show that
the beta of UK breakeven in￿ ation was positive in the period prior to 1999 and turned neg-
ative and signi￿cant in the post-1998 period, suggesting that in￿ ation risk in nominal bonds
has varied over time and was much more pronounced in the ￿rst half of the sample.
33Interestingly, Figure 5B suggests that the UK breakeven risk premium shot up during
the ￿nancial crisis. In the framework of Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira (2010) this could
indicate that while investors in the UK feared that further economic deterioration would
go along with in￿ ation, US investors were concerned about low growth accompanied by low
in￿ ation or even de￿ ation.
III Testing For Market Segmentation E⁄ects in the US
and UK Bond Markets
Sections I and II have presented evidence of the impact of liquidity on breakeven in￿ ation
and on TIPS and breakeven returns. In this section we explore the role of shocks to rel-
ative supply as a source of bond return predictability. The preferred-habitat hypothesis
of Modigliani and Sutch (1966) states that the preference of certain types of investors for
speci￿c bond maturities might result in supply imbalances and price pressure in the bond
market. In recent work Vayanos and Vila (2009) formalize this hypothesis in a theory where
risk averse arbitrageurs do not fully o⁄set the price imbalances generated by the presence of
preferred-habitat investors in the bond market, leading to excess bond return predictability.
Greenwood and Vayanos (2008) and Hamilton and Wu (2010) ￿nd empirical support for this
theory using the relative supply of nominal Treasury bonds at di⁄erent maturities as a proxy
for supply shocks.
We test whether segmentation between in￿ ation-indexed and nominal bond markets in-
duces relative price ￿ uctuations and return predictability in an empirical setup similar to
34Greenwood and Vayanos (2008). If supply is subject to exogenous shocks while clientele de-
mand is stable over time we would expect increases in the relative supply of in￿ ation-indexed
bonds to be correlated with contemporary decreases in breakeven in￿ ation, as the price of
in￿ ation-indexed bonds falls in response to excess supply. Subsequently we would expect to
see positive returns on in￿ ation-indexed bonds as their prices rebound.
Alternatively, it could be the case that bond demand changes over time, and the gov-
ernment tries to accommodate changes in demand. This would be consistent with a debt
management policy that tries to take advantage of interest rate di⁄erentials across both
markets. In this case we would expect the relative supply of in￿ ation-indexed bonds to be
unrelated to subsequent returns, and possibly to be even positively correlated with contem-
poraneous breakeven in￿ ation.
We measure the relative supply of in￿ ation-indexed bonds in the US as the nominal
amount of TIPS outstanding relative to US government TIPS, notes and bonds outstand-
ing.19 The relative supply variable for the UK is computed similarly, as the total amount of
in￿ ation-linked gilts relative to the total amount of conventional gilts outstanding. 20
Let DTIPS
t denote the face value of in￿ ation-indexed bonds outstanding and Dt the
combined face value of nominal and in￿ ation-indexed bonds outstanding at time t for either
19The economic report of the president reports US Treasury securities by kind of obligation and reports
T-bills, Treasury notes, Treasury bonds and TIPS separately. The data can be found in Table 85 for the
reports until 2000 and in Table 87 in subsequent reports at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/download.html.
The face value of TIPS outstanding available in the data is the original face value at issuance times the
in￿ ation incurred since then and therefore it increases with in￿ ation. The numbers include both privately
held Treasury securities and Federal Reserve and intragovernmental holdings as in Greenwood and Vayanos
(2008).
20We are deeply grateful to the UK Debt Management O¢ ce for providing us with the UK data. Con-
ventional gilts exclude ￿ oating-rate and double-dated gilts but include undated gilts. The face value of
index-linked gilts does not include in￿ ation-uplift and is reported as the original nominal issuance value.















t￿1 ￿ (Dt ￿ Dt￿1)=Dt￿1: (17)
Finally, it could be that most bond issuance is predictable and it might therefore not
lead to relative price ￿ uctuations. We therefore construct a measure of unexpected relative
issuance "
Supply
t . In the Appendix we conduct Dickey-Fuller tests to ￿nd that in the US we
cannot reject a unit root in Supplyt or in ￿Supplyt: However, the year-over-year change in
relative issuance appears stationary and we construct a supply shock "
Supply
t as the residual
from an autoregression of ￿Supplyt￿￿Supplyt￿12 with twelve lags. In the UK we can reject
stationarity in relative issuance ￿Supplyt; potentially re￿ ecting the less regular issuance cycle
in the UK, and we construct a supply shock "
Supply
t as the residual from an autoregression of
￿Supplyt with twelve lags.
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 6A plots the relative supply of TIPS, DTIPS
t =Dt, and 10 year breakeven in￿ ation
in the US. Starting from less than 2% in 1997 TIPS increased to represent over 14% of the
US Treasury coupon bond portfolio in 2008. Subsequently to the ￿nancial crisis the US
government issued substantial amounts of nominal notes and bonds, leading to a drop in
36the relative TIPS share to 9% in 2010. At the same time the level of breakeven in￿ ation
remained relatively steady over this 11 year period with a large drop in the fall of 2008, as
discussed earlier.
Figure 6B illustrates that the relative share of UK linkers has increased over the period
from about 9% in 1985 to 16% in 2010. At the same time 20 year UK breakeven in￿ ation has
fallen in the period 1985-2010, reaching a low of 2.1% in 1998. The increase in in￿ ation-linked
bonds outstanding accelerated noticeably after 2004.21
[TABLE V ABOUT HERE]
In Table V, we test whether the relative yields of in￿ ation-indexed and nominal bonds
are related to our measures of relative supply. If markets are segmented and subject to
exogenous supply shocks we would expect a negative coe¢ cient on measures of relative
supply of in￿ ation-indexed bonds. Table VA shows that in the US neither the relative
supply nor relative issuance ￿Supplyt or the supply shock "
Supply
t appear to be related to
breakeven in￿ ation, either individually or jointly. These results are robust to controlling for
liquidity proxies and for a time trend.
Table VB shows similar empirical results for the UK over a signi￿cantly longer time
period. Due to data constraints we are not able to control for liquidity. The supply variable
is signi￿cant but it switches sign as we include a time trend in the regression, while the
change in supply or the supply shock "
Supply
t do not enter signi￿cantly. The time trend is
21Greenwood and Vayanos (2009) analyze this episode in light of the UK Pensions Act of 2004, which
provided pension funds with a strong incentive to buy long-maturity and in￿ ation-linked government bonds
and subsequently led the government to increase issuance of long-maturity and in￿ ation-linked bonds.
37highly statistically signi￿cant and increases the R2 from 26% to 65%.
Figure 6B helps to interpret the supply coe¢ cient￿ s sign change when adding a time trend.
Since the mid-1980￿ s the supply of in￿ ation linkers in the UK has risen, while breakeven
in￿ ation has been generally declining. This secular decline in breakeven in￿ ation likely
re￿ ects changes in monetary policy and declines in both realized and expected in￿ ation
(Campbell, Shiller, and Viceira 2009), rather than changes in bond supply. Introducing a
time trend takes care of this common inverse trend, and switches the sign of the slope on
the supply variable to positive. This positive partial correlation might lend weight to the
interpretation that the UK government reacts to increased demand for in￿ ation-linked bonds
by issuing more in￿ ation-indexed bonds.
Fleckenstein, Longsta⁄, and Lustig (2010) argue that the supply of Treasury securities
a⁄ects the relative mispricing of in￿ ation-indexed and nominal bonds. Their empirical results
can be reconciled with ours. We use the theoretically motivated relative supply of in￿ ation-
indexed bonds, while they include both the supply of TIPS and of Treasuries separately
in their regressions. The sign of their results is such that TIPS become relatively more
expensive, when the Treasury issues more TIPS and this result is again inconsistent with a
market segmentation hypothesis.
If markets are segmented in the sense of Greenwood and Vayanos (2009) we would expect
a positive shock in the relative supply of in￿ ation-indexed bonds to predict lower excess
returns on nominal bonds over in￿ ation-indexed bonds. Table VI explores this prediction
of the segmentation hypothesis. Our left-hand-side variables in Table VI are the nominal,
in￿ ation-indexed and breakeven returns as de￿ned in (3), (4) and (5). Table VI shows that
in the US and in the UK the supply variables do not help to predict bond excess returns.
38Campbell and Shiller (1996) showed that the nominal term spread can predict excess returns
on long-term nominal bonds. Moreover, P￿ ueger and Viceira (2011) show that TIPS term
spreads and breakeven term spreads are signi￿cant predictors of the corresponding excess
returns and therefore we control for these spreads in our regressions. We saw in Section
II that liquidity predicts the liquidity component of bond excess returns and we therefore
include it as an additional control.
[TABLE VI ABOUT HERE]
Table VI shows that even after including liquidity and supply e⁄ects, the nominal term
spread enters positively for nominal bond excess returns and its slope coe¢ cient is signi￿cant
in the UK. The breakeven term spread predicts breakeven excess returns both in the US and
in the UK. The TIPS term spread predicts TIPS excess returns both in the UK but is
marginally insigni￿cant in the US over our sample period. Relative supply shocks therefore
cannot explain why term spreads predict excess returns on in￿ ation-indexed bonds and on
nominal bonds in excess of in￿ ation-indexed bonds.
In summary, there is no evidence of relative supply shocks predicting bond excess returns
in either the UK or the US. These results do not seem consistent with segmented markets
that are subject to exogenous supply shocks. Instead they might indicate that US and UK
governments accommodate demand pressures from investors for nominal or in￿ ation-indexed
bonds.22
22Anectodal evidence suggests that this is the case, at least for the UK. Unlike the US Treasury, the British
Treasury has an irregular auction calendar and it appears to take into account bond demand when deciding
the size and characteristics of bond issues.
39The empirical evidence in Table IV suggests that raw TIPS excess returns and breakeven
excess returns are predictable from their respective term spreads and that our return-
predictability results in Table III also hold without adjusting for liquidity. Comparing Tables
III(2) and Table VI(3), we see that the TIPS return-predictability regressions are not sen-
sitive to the assumption that all variation in relative liquidity is due to variation in TIPS
liquidity rather than liquidity in nominal Treasuries. Table VI(7) shows that in the UK
over a longer time period the TIPS term spread signi￿cantly predicts TIPS excess returns,
indicating a time-varying real interest rate risk premium.
IV Conclusion
This paper explores the sources of time variation in bond risk premia in in￿ ation-indexed and
nominal bonds in the US and in the UK. We ￿nd strong empirical evidence that nominal
bond excess return predictability is related to a time-varying in￿ ation risk premium. As
also provide empirical evidence for liquidity as a source of return predictability in in￿ ation-
indexed bonds in the US.
Using a variety of liquidity indicators, we ￿nd that the liquidity premium on TIPS yields
relative to nominal Treasury bond yields exhibits strong time-variation, with a large premium
early in the life of TIPS, a signi￿cant decline to a lower premium after 2004, and a sharp
increase to over 150 bps during the height of the ￿nancial crisis in the fall of 2008 and winter
of 2009. Since then, the premium has declined back to more normal levels of 50 to 70 bps.
Time-varying liquidity explains up to 66% of the time-series variance of breakeven in￿ a-
tion. Once we adjust breakeven in￿ ation for liquidity e⁄ects, we ￿nd it to be stable over our
40sample period around 3%, suggesting that bond investors￿long-term in￿ ation expectations
in the US have not moved signi￿cantly, even during the ￿nancial crisis.
In our analysis of price pressures due to supply shocks in the in￿ ation-indexed bond
market we ￿nd no evidence for a supply channel in either the US or in the UK. If anything,
our results are consistent with the government trying to accommodate shifts in the demand
for nominal bonds, relative to in￿ ation-indexed bonds.
Our liquidity premium is correlated with other liquidity spreads in ￿xed income markets,
particularly the o⁄-the-run spread (Krishnamurthy, 2002), and it exhibits an economically
and statistically signi￿cant positive CAPM beta, suggesting that the liquidity premium is
at least partly systematic in nature. A simple calculation also suggests that the liquidity
returns on TIPS during normal times are comparable to the liquidity returns on o⁄-the-run
nominal Treasury bonds.
The liquidity premiumdoes not predict liquidity-adjusted returns on TIPS or on breakeven,
so that it does not seem to proxy for any real interest rate risk or in￿ ation risk. Hence, while
we ￿nd that the liquidity di⁄erential between nominal bonds and TIPS moves with the ag-
gregate market, it bears no relationship to the real cash ￿ ow risks of the speci￿c securities,
a conclusion that should be important in guiding future models of liquidity.
A possible interpretation is that we partly identify a liquidity premium or convenience
yield on nominal Treasury bonds (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2010), rather than
a liquidity discount speci￿c to TIPS. Under this interpretation TIPS are not undervalued
securities; instead investors appear to be willing to pay a liquidity premium on nominal Trea-
sury bonds. The Treasury could take advantage of this premium by issuing more nominal
41Treasury bonds, but it would still be issuing TIPS at their fair value. If investors appro-
priately value TIPS, taking them o⁄ the market might have adverse welfare consequences
for investors in need of the real interest rate hedge and in￿ ation hedge o⁄ered by TIPS
(Campbell and Viceira 2002).
Our results suggest several directions for future research. First, in￿ ation expectations
are a major input into monetary policy. One could adjust breakeven in￿ ation for the forms
of in￿ ation risk premia and liquidity premia found in this paper to obtain a measure of
long-term expected in￿ ation. It would be informative to see whether this is a good predictor
of future in￿ ation and other macroeconomic variables when a longer historical time series
of TIPS becomes available. Second, di⁄erent classes of investors have di⁄erent degrees of
exposure to time-varying liquidity, real interest rate risk and in￿ ation risk. It would be
interesting to understand the implications for portfolio management and pension investing
and how these implications vary by investment horizon and the investor￿ s share of real and
nominal liabilities. Third, our analysis of supply e⁄ects in the in￿ ation-indexed market
suggests to further explore strategic behavior by the government in accommodating shifts in
the demand for nominal and real bonds.
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Figure 1. US Liquidity Proxies 1999-2010. Relative TIPS Trading Volume from
New York Federal Reserve survey FR-2004; TIPS-Nominal Asset-Swap Spread
from Barclays Live; Synthetic Breakeven from Bloomberg;
10 Year On-the-Run O⁄-The-Run spread from the Gurkaynak, Sack,
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Figure 2. Estimated US Liquidity Premium. 10 Year TIPS liquidity
premium estimated in Table II (4). The liquidity premium is estimated
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Figure 3. Liquidity-Adjusted US 10 Year Breakeven In￿ ation.
We adjust breakeven in￿ ation (the di⁄erence between nominal
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Figure 4. Liquidity-Adjusted US TIPS. We adjust US 10 Year
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Figure 5A. Estimated US Risk Premia. The real rate risk
premium, in￿ ation risk premium and liquidity return premium
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Figure 5B. Estimated UK Bond Risk Premia. The nominal
risk premium, TIPS risk premium and breakeven risk premium
are obtained for 1985.10-2010.12 similarly to P￿ ueger and
Viceira (2011). We show ￿tted values for UK regressions of
nominal excess returns, TIPS excess returns and breakeven
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Figure 6A. US Relative Supply and 10 Year Breakeven In￿ ation.
Relative supply shows the total amount of TIPS relative to the
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Figure 6B. UK Relative Supply and 20 Year Breakeven.
Relative supply shows the total amount of in￿ ation-linked gilts relative
to nominal and in￿ ation-linked gilts outstanding.
8Table I
Summary Statistics
US data is monthly 1999.6-2010.12 and UK data is monthly 1985.4-2010.12. The US
asset-swap spread is monthly 2004.1-2010.12. \Synthetic - cash" is the dierence
between the ination swap spread rate and cash breakeven ination and runs from
2004.7-2010.12. \Transaction volume" is the log TIPS transaction volume relative to
the log transaction volume of government coupon securities with at least 6 years to
maturity. 
SPF denotes the median 10 year CPI-ination forecast from the Survey of
Professional Forecasters. 
SPF is released in the middle month. For each month end we
report the most recent release. Yields and spreads are in annualized % units. Quarterly
overlapping nominal excess log returns xr
$
n;t+1, TIPS excess log returns xr
TIPS
n;t+1 and
breakeven excess log returns xr
b
n;t+1 are also in annualized %. * and ** denote
signicance at the 5% and 1% levels.
Panel A: US 10 YR Panel B: UK 20 YR
Mean Std Min Max Mean Std Min Max
y$
n;t 4.66 0.87 2.66 6.70 6:30 1:94 3:79 9:93
yTIPS
n;t 2.41 0.89 0:59 4:29 2:72 1:18 0:57 4:57
bn;t 2.25 0:39 0:39 2:87 3:59 0:93 2:07 5:72
xr$
n;t+1 4.19 8.75 -41.89 56.62 3.69 14.63 -104.94 109.35
xrTIPS
n;t+1 4.66 7.63 -64.91 58.03 2.14 9.09 -65.78 63.67
xrb
n;t+1 -0.48 7.30 -42.62 74.33 1.55 12.30 -102.40 84.86
SPF 2.47 0.07 2.2 2.55
O-the-Run Spr. 0:21 0:11 0:07 0:63
Asset-Swap Spr. 0.55 0.24 0.33 1.34
Transaction Vol. -0.55 0.43 -1.44 0.00














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Forecasted Real Short Rate
Overlapping quarterly realized real return on nominal
3 month T-bill onto the nominal 3 month T-bill, 3 month
lagged realized real return on 3 month T-bill and
in￿ ation over the past year. Newey-West standard
errors with 4 lags in parentheses. * and ** denote
signi￿cance at the 5% and 1% level.
(1) (2)
y$





1;t ￿ ￿t 0.10 -0.08
(0.08) (0.05)









Variables as in Table II. Newey-West standard errors with three
lags in parentheses. The p-value of the F-test for no predictability
is shown. * and ** denote signi￿cance at the 5% and 1% level.
y$
n;t￿yTIPS











const: 0.38** 0.23 -0.07 -0.10* 0.33**
(0.07) (0.13) (0.13) (0.04) (0.12)
p ￿ value 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00
R2 0.57 0.27 0.06 0.38 0.34
Sample 1999.3-2010.12
2Table A.III
Estimating Liquidity in Quarterly Changes
We replicate Table II using quarterly changes. Newey-West standard errors with three lags in parentheses.






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
￿ O⁄-the-Run Spr. -2.76** -1.38* -1.36* -1.27* -1.82**
(0.67) (0.56) (0.55) (0.53) (0.48)
￿ Asset-Swap Spr. -1.18** -1.18** -1.13**
(0.34) (0.36) (0.35)
￿ TransactionVol. -0.19 -0.18 -0.23
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19)




const: 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
p ￿ value
R2 0.34 0.42 0.44 0.45 0.45
Sample 1999.3-2010.12
3Table A.IV
Estimating Liquidity with Additional Controls
We replicate Table II including interaction terms and the TIPS bid-ask spread. The TIPS bid-ask spread
is from Tradeweb and available 2005.3-2010.6. We set to its 2005.3 value before 2005.3 and to its 2010.6
value after 2010.6. Newey-West standard errors with three lags in parentheses. The p-value of the
F-test for no predictability is shown. * and ** denote signi￿cance at the 5% and 1% level.
y$
n;t￿yTIPS
n;t ￿￿SPF (1) (2) (3) (4)
O⁄-the-Run Spr. 1.17 1.31 1.06 -1.20**
(0.92) (1.06) (1.04) (0.35)
Asset-Swap Spr. -0.38 -0.41 -0.17 -0.61*
(0.27) (0.29) (0.61) (0.30)
Transaction Vol. 0.35** 0.31 0.35** 0.28**
(0.09) (0.18) (0.10) (0.09)
CFNAI 0.14** 0.14** 0.14** 0.12**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)






TIPS Bid-Ask Spread -0.03
(0.31)
const: 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.50**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.17) (0.11)
p ￿ value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.66
Sample 1999.3-2010.12
4Table A.V
Return Predictability Liquidity US
Nonlinear Liquidity
Return-predictability regressions as in Table III. We adjust for nonlinear liquidity as estimated
in Table A.IV (1). Newey-West standard errors with three lags appear in parentheses. The p-value
















1;t 2.71* 2.79 -1.72 -0.21
Newey-West SE (1.31) (1.48) (1.21) (0.54)
Bootstrap p-value 25.6% 19.5% 13.7% 29.1%
(bn;t + Ln;t)￿b1;t -0.34 4.63** 5.37** -0.38
Newey-West SE (2.83) (1.60) (1.53) (1.81)
Bootstrap p-value 18.7% 0.05% 0.0% 41.2%
Ln;t 4.06 3.93 -6.63 -3.74 15.43**
Newey-West SE (8.47) (9.08) (4.46) (5.49) (4.14)
Bootstrap p-value 17.7% 27.0% 11.6% 23.8% 0.0%
p ￿ value 0.06 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.00
R2 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.22
Sample 1999.6-2010.12
5Table A.VI
Return Predictability Liquidity US
Tradeable Excess Returns
We run liquidity-adjusted return-predictive regressions as in Table III. We consider
liquidity-adjusted log nominal bond returns on TIPS over nominal returns on the
nominal T-bill rate r
TIPS￿L
n;t ￿ rTbill
t as a tradeable version of liquidity-adjusted log
excess returns of TIPS. We also consider liquidity-adjusted log nominal bond returns




tradeable version of liquidity-adjusted breakeven returns. Newey-West standard errors
with three lags appear in parentheses. The p-value of the F-test for no predictability is

















1;t 2.38 2.65 -1.49
Newey-West SE (1.55) (1.75) (1.66)
Bootstrap p-value 36.2% 27.5% 30.5%
(bn;t + Ln;t)￿b1;t -1.02 5.20* 5.85**
Newey-West SE (2.50) (2.12) (2.23)
Bootstrap p-value 12.7% 0.5% 0.1%
Ln;t 4.20 3.71 -7.77 -4.59
Newey-West SE (8.49) (9.24) (5.65) (7.33)
Bootstrap p-value 20.2% 24.9% 10.1% 21.4%
p ￿ value 0.12 0.20 0.04 0.07




We regress liquidity-adjusted and non liquidity-adjusted excess log government bond returns onto
excess log stock returns. All variables are described in Table IV. Newey-West standard errors are
computed with 3 lags. * and ** denote signi￿cance at the 5% and 1% level for ^ ￿ and ^ ￿, respectively.
Panel A: US 1999.6-2010.12 1999.6-2006.12 2002.1-2010.12
b ￿ b ￿ b ￿ b ￿ b ￿ b ￿
Excess Log Return Nominal -0.19** 4.21* -0.23* 3.66 -0.19** 4.21*
Excess Log Return TIPS 0.01 4.66* -0.16* 4.36** 0.03 4.89*
Excess Log Return BEI -0.21* -0.45 -0.07 -0.69 -0.22* -0.01
Liq.-Adj. Exc. Log Ret. BEI -0.09 0.54 -0.04 0.72 -0.09 0.71
Liq.-Adj. Exc. Log Ret. TIPS -0.11 3.67* -0.19** 2.94* -0.10 4.16*
Log Return Liquidity 0.12** 0.99 0.03 1.41** 0.13** 0.72
Panel B: UK 1985.7-2010.12 1985.7-2006.12 1985.7-1998.12 1999.1-2010.12
b ￿ b ￿ b ￿ b ￿ b ￿ b ￿ b ￿ b ￿
Excess Log Return Nominal 0.15 3.16 0.19 3.45 0.31 4.26 -0.07 0.86
Excess Log Return TIPS 0.14** 1.63 0.13* 1.58 0.16* 0.53 0.13 2.77
Excess Log Return BEI 0.01 1.53 0.06 1.87 0.15 3.73 -0.20* -1.91
Table A.VIII
Four Factor Regressions
US liquidity-adjusted and non liquidity-adjusted excess log government bond returns onto excess log
stock returns xr
equity
t+1 ; the SMB factor , the HML factor, and innovations in the Pastor-Stambaugh
liquidity factor. Annualized (%). Newey-West standard errors with 3 lags in brackets. * and ** denote
signi￿cance at the 5% and 1% level.











t+1 -0.13* 0.08 -0.21* -0.04 -0.09 0.12**
(0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04)
HML 0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.05 0.01
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.02)
SMB -0.16* -0.11 -0.05 -0.14* -0.02 0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Pastor-Stambaugh -0.07* -0.08* 0.01 -0.07* -0.00 -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
const. 5.00* 5.23** -0.22 4.56** 0.45 0.67
(1.99) (1.81) (1.60) (1.50) (1.31) (0.64)
7Table A.IX
Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests
We report Dickey-Fuller test for the null-hypothesis of a unit root with twelve lags. Supplyt
denotes the amount of in￿ ation-indexed bonds outstanding relative to all nominal and
in￿ ation-indexed bonds outstanding. ￿Supplyt denotes the relative issuance of in￿ ation-
indexed bonds relative to all nominal and in￿ ation-indexed bonds issuance.
￿Supplyt ￿ ￿Supplyt￿12 is the change in relative issuance over the past 12 months.
* and ** denote signi￿cance at the 5% and 1% level respectively.
Panel A: US
Supplyt ￿Supplyt ￿Supplyt ￿ ￿Supplyt￿12
￿2:02 ￿2:12 ￿3:25￿
Sample 1999:1 ￿ 2010:12 1999:2 ￿ 2010:12 2000:2 ￿ 2010:12
Panel B: UK
Supplyt ￿Supplyt ￿Supplyt ￿ ￿Supplyt￿12
￿1:96 ￿4:75￿￿ ￿2:65
Sample 1986:1 ￿ 2010:12 1986:1 ￿ 2010:12 1987:1 ￿ 2010:12
Table A.X
Supply Autoregression
We regress relative issuance ￿Supplyt; as described in Table V onto its own twelve lags. We also regress
the 12-month change in relative issuance onto its own twelve lags. We report the sum of the twelve
autoregressive coe¢ cients.
Panel A: US Panel B: UK
￿Supplyt
￿￿Supplyt￿12 ￿Supplyt




Sample 2000:2 ￿ 2010:12 1986:1 ￿ 2010:12
8Table A.XI
Sample Correlations of Exess Returns and Spreads
Monthly data of quarterly overlapping returns and in￿ ation 1999.6-2010.12.










n;t+1 1 -0.07 -0.02
xr
b+L
n;t+1 . 1 -0.20
rL











1;t 1 0.31 0.37
(bn;t + Ln;t) ￿ b1;t . 1 0.07
Ln;t . . 1
9Figure A.1. Recently Issued and Less Recently Issued 10 Year TIPS. GSW 10 Year
TIPS yields from Gurkaynak, Sack and Wright (2010); 10 Year TIPS maturing in 07/2018
(reference CPI 215.7), 01/2018 (reference CPI 209.5) and 01/2017 (reference CPI 201.7)
from Bloomberg.
10